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Performance Evaluation of an Anomaly-Detection Algorithm for
Keystroke-Typing Based Insider Detection
Liang He, Zhixiang Li, and Chao Shen
Abstract: Keystroke dynamics is the process to identify or authenticate individuals based on their typing rhythm
behaviors. Several classifications have been proposed to verify a user’s legitimacy, and the performances of
these classifications should be confirmed to identify the most promising research direction. However, classification
research contains several experiments with different conditions such as datasets and methodologies. This study
aims to benchmark the algorithms to the same dataset and features to equally measure all performances. Using
a dataset that contains the typing rhythm of 51 subjects, we implement and evaluate 15 classifiers measured by
F1-measure, which is the harmonic mean of a false-negative identification rate and false-positive identification rate.
We also develop a methodology to process the typing data. By considering a case in which the model will reject the
outsider, we tested the algorithms on an open set. Additionally, we tested different parameters in random forest and
k nearest neighbors classifications to achieve better results and explore the cause of their high performance. We
also tested the dataset on one-class classification and explained the results of the experiment. The top-performing
classifier achieves an F1-measure rate of 92% while using the normalized typing data of 50 subjects to train and
the remaining data to test. The results, along with the normalization methodology, constitute a benchmark for
comparing the classifiers and measuring the performance of keystroke dynamics for insider detection.
Key words: keystroke dynamics; insider identification; F1-measure; normalization; one-class classification
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Introduction

Insider attack has always been a major threat to
the information and cyber security of enterprises and
government agencies. Insiders are very difficult to
detect and defend against, and they can exploit the
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privileges that do not belong to them for malicious
purposes, such as for stealing confidential data or
obtaining root privileges in a system. According to
recent reports from the US National Threat Assessment
Center[1] and Australian Cyber Security Centre[2, 3] ,
threats from insider attacks have overtaken malware as
the most reported security incident. The most common
approach to address this problem is the usage of
various password mechanisms. However, majority of
the passwords are simple and easily predicted because
of users’ preference in terms of convenience and
memorization[4, 5] . Therefore, methods to identify the
person who accesses the system that is not based
only on the password mechanism can significantly
curb the threats caused by insiders. From among
the various solutions to this problem, the use of
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keystroke-typing behavior[6, 7] , which offers an ability
to ascertain the typing characteristics of a user to verify
her/his identity easily, is considered to be a promising
technique. As a new behavioral biometric, this
behavior has been strongly driven by the requirement
for nonintrusive verification of insider detection
and monitoring applications. Compared with other
biometric techniques, such as fingerprints or voice,
keystroke dynamics is observed to be nonintrusive,
and the data can be collected in a relatively effortless
manner. When a genius user accesses the system using
a keyboard, comparing the keystroke rhythm with the
user, insiders can be detected and rejected because
their typing styles differ significantly. Furthermore,
the typing characteristics of users can be continuously
analyzed during the subsequent interaction process to
enforce identity monitoring.
Typing habits differ from one user to another, so
verification of people based on their typing patterns
is possible, and identification is achievable[8] . In
particular, there are really two tasks of interest:
verification and identification. Verification checks a
user’s claimed identity, detecting whether a person
accessing the system is the logical user or not.
Identification establishes a user’s identity, and identifies
the illegitimate person. Both tactics fight against insider
threats.
Various methods have been used to verify whether
a person accessing the system is an attacker or not,
although verification only needs a small sample of
the user’s typing data[8] . Identification can recognize
the attacker, leading to a wide range of applications.
However, most of the existing algorithms need a large
amount of keystroke data and the recognition is based
on comparisons with profiles of all other existing users
already in the system.
Although there are many previous research studies
on verification and identification based on keystroke
rhythm, most of the algorithms need the dataset from
imposters/attackers. Identification is taken as a multiclassification and the label of every item is necessary,
which limits the practical application. However, if we
can build a model of everyone with his/her labeled
typing data and a small sample of others’ typing data,
it will be scalable when new individuals are considered
without rebuilding the model of everyone already in the
system.
Evaluating and contrasting these classifiers has not
been performed for the following reasons: (1) there is
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no universally accepted dataset on keystroke dynamics,
leading to different classifiers being tested on various
datasets, and (2) there is no consistent evaluation of
the classifiers’ performance. Some research is tested
on the same dataset with various environment and
features. It is therefore necessary to benchmark the
dataset and performance indicator to serve as reference
values across conditions.
In this study, we develop a benchmark for user
identification based on keystroke rhythm, and compare
different algorithms, such as k nearest neighbors and
random forest, under various parameters. In order to
build the model of the typing pattern for each person,
the multi-classification was changed to one against the
rest classification, and only part of the other subjects
are labeled as negative. Therefore, it is not necessary to
rebuild the model of individuals who already have one.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 describes the background and related work on
keystroke dynamics. Section 3 introduces and visualizes
the dataset. Section 4 elaborates on the pre-processing
of the dataset. Section 5 describes the 15 algorithms
implemented in this study. Section 6 presents the
experimental results and analysis, including an open
set test and one-class classifiers. Section 7 provides
advice on the future work. Finally, Section 8 provides a
conclusion.

2

Background and Related Work

In this section, a brief introduction of keystroke
dynamics is offered as well as a comparison of each
classifier in order to show the different methodologies
of datasets and the operating environment of each work.
Each person has a specific way to type his/her
password, and the habit will likely not be changed
once formed. Keystroke dynamics refers to a method
to record one’s behavioral biometric data, containing
the unique biometric template of their typing pattern,
which provides an accessible manner for individual
authentication and identification[9] . Table 1 presents a
brief summary of some research using classification
algorithms to identify or authenticate users by the
keystroke rhythm dataset. The studies listed in Table
1 describe the experiments and results on various
datasets.
Classifier: The algorithm used for user identification
in each study, where GMM is the Gaussian Mixture
Model, k-NN is the k nearest neighbors algorithm, and
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Table 1 Several different studies investigating various classification algorithms and reported evaluation results, where the
diversity of the conditions makes direct comparison of the results impossible.
Source
research
Joyce and Gupta
(1990)[6]
Coltell et al.
(1999)[7]
Yu and Cho
(2003)[10]
Araujo et al.
(2005)[11]
Hosseinzadeh
et al. (2006)[12]
Hosseinzadeh and
Krishnan (2008)[13]
Villant
(2009)[14]
Maxion et al.
(2010)[15]

Classifier

Users

Data collection
Task
Length
Name and
No
password
limit

Ext


Manhattan

33

Compose

10

Password

80

SVM

21

Password

6–10

k-NN

30

Text

10



GMM

8

Name

10



GMM

41

Name

10



E-NN

36

Text

Hello
world



Random
forest

28

Number

10



Bours
(2012)[16]

Normal
distance

25

Text

Sample
fixed key
pairs



Deng and Zhong
(2013)[17]

GMM with
the universal
background
model

51

Password

10



Zheng et al.
(2014)[18]

One-class
nearest
neighbors

Buschek et al.
(2015)[19]
Antal and Szabó
(2015)[20]

GMM
k-NN
One-class
k-NN
One-class
Gaussian


p

53
41
42
27
25
28
28

Numeric
keyboard

4/8



Password
Password

8
8

42

Password

10



p

42

Password

10

E-NN is the nearest neighbors with Euclidean distance.
Users: The number of users or subjects in the dataset
of each study.
Task: The context that the users type when collecting
the dataset.
Extensibility: Whether to retrain the model when
taking new subjects into consideration.
Feature source: The source of features used to train
and test in each study, where H stands for the latency
the key is pressed, UD for keyup-keydown, and DD for
keydown-keydown. These abbreviations are also used
in this paper.
Target: Whether the study is to identify or

p

Feature source
H UD DD
p

Target
Auth Iden
p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p
p

p

p
p

p

p

FAR
6:67

0:01

–

0

30

–

–

3:54

–

1:89

1:45

–

2:1

2:4

–

3:9

6:3

–

–

0:5

–

1:51

–

8:60

Number of
key pair ranges
from 79 to 348

p

p

p

–

p

p

p

p

p
p

p
p

p
p

p
p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

Result (%)
FRR
ERR

–

5:5

–

–

–
–

–
–

3:65
(Average
on
all)
30:84
29:48

5:0

11:0

–

4:0

16:0

–

authenticate, where identification is to determine and
recognize, and authentication is only to decide. Auth
is for Authentication and Iden is for Identification.
Result: FRR, the percentage of the insiders that are
not detected; FAR, the percentage of the legitimate
individuals that are detected as insiders; EER, the
equal error rate of the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve.
From the research listed in Table 1, the approaches
were implemented by (1) different classifiers based
on whether to identify or authenticate; (2) various
datasets with distinct sizes of subjects and different
contexts to type; (3) different combinations of typing
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features; (4) different thresholds to obtain different
FAR/FRR/EER. Additionally, the experiments were
typically not replicated, so it is difficult to make the
differences clear, and the results of each experiment
are not comparable because it is not clear whether the
feature or the dataset is the factor. It is necessary to
control all the factors in the same condition for the
performance to be compared clearly.

3

Dataset and Visualization

In this section, we introduce the dataset and provide
a visualization of two subjects’ typing rhythm. We
develop an intuitive perception of typing data for
different subjects that may appear in different lengths.
3.1

Dataset introduction

The dataset is from Ref. [21]. Killourhy and Maxion
proposed the dataset in order to give a benchmark for
anomaly detection[22] , which only gives verification of
illegitimate user access.
The typing rhythm may contain too many latencies
for the users’ thinking or finding keys if the text is
not familiar to them. Therefore, the users are asked
to practice the same password several times until they
are comfortable with the string, and then the rhythm
is recorded. Additionally, the password is fixed and
contains shift, space, period, and number keys, which
cover most of passwords. Furthermore, the length of the
string is 11, not too long for the users to require a break
when typing, and not too short to dampen the feature in
noise.
In order to make the keystroke task representative,
we only use the UD and H time in the dataset to give
a benchmark of user identification for the following
reasons: (1) the keystroke data have a linear additive
law, which means DD time is the sum of H and UD;
(2) not all of the classifiers are capable of redundancy.
Therefore, we use only two features of keystroke
rhythm for the benchmark of each classifier.
3.2

Dataset visualization

We display all typing rhythms of two subjects in Fig. 1
with the mean of the typing data in the middle marked
as large nodes, where the red nodes are for the time
when the key is pressed and the blue nodes are for the
key released. The data of different subjects have very
different means as the time of each datum is not similar.
As shown in Fig. 1, typing data for one subject
are different in length, resulting in an unrepresentative
mean. Therefore, the typing data of different lengths

Fig. 1

Typing data of subjects s002 and s003.

should be measured under the same metric.

4

Feature Construction

In Section 3, we come up with a method to pre-process
the typing data and extract the feature. The visualization
of subjects’ typing data after normalization is shown
to explain the reason for pre-processing and feature
extraction. Additionally, by comparing each mean
typing datum in Euclidean space, the typing data appear
to be in a pattern after normalization.
4.1

Feature analysis

Since data of a certain subject have different lengths,
a natural way to make them similar is normalization,
which means normalizing by the time of each datum.
Figure 2 shows the same subjects shown in Fig. 1 after
normalization. Each datum looks similar to the mean
after normalization. Additionally, the keystroke actions
in the vertical direction appear to be centralized and
characterized.
As shown in Fig. 2, some typing moments are well
clustered and the mean is representative, while there
are also moments with discrete distribution. However,
compared to the raw dataset, the typing data tend to be
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of every subject are separated by green and blue. As
shown in Fig. 3, some of the typing data are far away
from the others measured by the Euclidean method,
such as s011, s025, s036, and s052. The normalized
typing data of s036 and s052 are shown in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 4, the keystroke rhythms of s036 and s052 are
the most different. s036 types the key in a short moment
and the mean of the typing data is a clear pattern of the
moment a key is pressed, followed by the moment the
key is released. At the same time, the type of s052 is
also different. The latency between the first key lift and
the second key press is longer than the others, which
provides an obvious separation.

Fig. 2

Normalized typing data of subjects s002 and s003.

regular and the features can be used in this way.
When comparing the mean vectors after
normalization, the vectors are different from each
other. If the normalized typing data of each subject is a
vector in Euclidean space, it is appropriate to determine
how it is distributed in space. The Euclidean distances
of every mean after normalization are shown in Fig. 3.
In Fig. 3, the abscissas are the subjects in the
dataset. There are 51 subjects in total, thus there are 50
Euclidean distances in the mean for one given subject,
i.e., 50 in one group and totally 50  51 points in the
figure. Each point stands for one Euclidean distance of
two subjects’ mean typing data. For clarity, the points

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Normalized typing data of subjects s036 and s052.

Euclidean distance between any two subjects in a dataset after normalization.
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4.2

Feature extraction

The dataset samples the time click of the keystrokes,
which is a record of the typing time. The same subject
types the same password types distinctly. Hence, the
data have noise and there might be correlation between
some typing latencies. DD latency is the sum of UD
and H. Consequently, the extracted H and UD latencies
are considered features.

where the function is the raw data without
normalization as we want to compare the difference
in the typing rhythm that varies with time. Dividing
by the area of function weakens the influence of the
interval length. However, the accuracy only increases
slightly. Thus, we try to use some other distances for
classification. Various distances exist to measure the
similarity of two points, such as Euclidean, Manhattan,
and Mahalanobis.

5

5.3

Classifier Implementation

In this section, we will discuss the implementation of
15 classifiers on keystroke dynamics for identification.
Besides the algorithms listed in Table 1, we also
implemented some other classical algorithms that can
be used to identify individuals. Each subject in the
dataset has one model in the classifiers, such as a mean
vector, in order to avoid rebuilding the models of all
subjects when new individuals are considered.
5.1

Classifier overview

In order to build the model of each user, we consider
the identification task as a multi-class classification
problem employing the one-against-rest approach.
There are 51 subjects in the dataset, and therefore for a
given subject, we use the other 50 subjects as a negative
label. We aim to build a model of users without needing
to rebuild when new users come. We therefore train the
model with part of the subject and then test it with the
remainder, which is known as an open set test.
5.2

Classifier 1: L1 norm

The distance of two keystroke rhythm vectors can be
measured by a distance defined similarly to the L1
norm. The keystroke rhythm is a function of time as
detailed in Sections 3 and 4. Therefore, a natural way to
classify it is the mathematical distance of two functions,
such as L1. The L1 norm of function f .x/ and g.x/ are
defined as follows: Z
1

D.f; g/ D

jf .x/

g.x/j dx

(1)

1

Since keystroke rhythm is a binary function, simply
defining the function to be 1 when the key is pressed and
0 when released, L1 norm only measures the internal
length where two functions have a different value.
When a certain function only values 1 in small intervals,
the L1 norm will be very small. So the raw typing time
should be considered. RThus, we redefine the norm as
1
jf .x/ g.x/j dx
Q
R1
(2)
D.f; g/ D R 1 1
1 jf .x/j dx
1 jg.x/j dx

Classifier 2: Euclidean

Euclidean distance classification models the typing
rhythm vector as a point in Euclidean space. When
training, a mean vector is calculated for each subject.
When testing, a point is classified to one class according
to the distance to every mean vector of the subjects.
We also compare the performance of raw data with
normalized data, where normalization is to divide the
data by the maximum.
The classifier based on distances with mean vectors
of each subject could not recognize the subjects not
appearing in the training dataset because the classifier
does not know the mean vector of the new individuals.
Additionally, a threshold can be set to limit the range
of each mean vector, and if the new typing data is
out of every mean vector range in the training dataset
measured by the threshold, a new cluster can be trained
when testing. However, if the typing data of each
subject are discrete in space and the new cluster is
mixed with others, the new individual will be badly
misclassified. So the classifiers based on the distance
is not fit for an open set test. We also implemented
the normalized Euclidean classifier with the normalized
dataset.
5.4

Classifier 3: Manhattan

This algorithm defined in Ref. [23] is similar to
Euclidean, with the distance measured by Manhattan
distance. When training, the mean vector of each
subjects’ typing data is calculated in Manhattan
distance. Therefore, when testing, the class with the
minimal Manhattan distance to the testing point is the
predicted label. Similar to the Euclidean classifier, we
implemented the normalized Manhattan classifier and
left out the open set test.
5.5

Classifier 4: Mahalanobis

This algorithm defined in Ref. [23] is also similar to
Euclidean and Manhattan, while the distance is slightly
complex by calculating the mean and covariance matrix
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of the training data. The class with the minimal distance
is the predicted label. Additionally, we implemented the
normalized Mahalanobis classifier and left out the open
set test. The Mahalanobis distance takes the covariance
into consideration, resulting in the normalization being
no different from the raw typing data.
5.6

Classifier 5: Fisher Linear Discriminant
Analysis (Fisher LDA)

Fisher LDA is a classifier with a linear decision surface.
The solution of the surface can be computed easily
and Fisher LDA can also classify linear separable data
with high accuracy. When training the Fisher LDA
model for one subject with a positive label, part of
the others’ typing data are labeled negative. Fisher
LDA aims to find a projection direction to which after
being projected, the positive and negative labeled data
have the minimal intraclass dispersion and maximal
interclass dispersion in the Euclidean space.
Fisher LDA provides the decision surface after
training as the model of one subject, and therefore it
can test on individuals no matter whether they are in the
training dataset or not. Thus, we implemented Fisher
LDA on the open set test. The dataset can be normalized
before training, and we tested the normalized Fisher
LDA as well.
5.7

Classifier 6: Gaussian Process Classification
(GPC) with Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel

GPC is a probabilistic model based on Bayesian
theory and statistical learning theory, which focuses on
modeling the posterior probabilities. When training, the
model calculates the probability with Gaussian function
of each subject. When testing, a posterior probability
vector is checked to see which class the testing vector
belongs to. The resulting label is the class with minimal
probability. We use the RBF kernel, which can either
stand for the distance between two data points or be
infinitely differentiable leading to a smooth classifier
surface, to calculate the similarity of two data points.
Additionally, GPC was tested on the open set and both
normalized and raw datasets.
5.8

Classifiers 7–10: Support Vector Machine
(SVM) with Linear, Polynomial, RBF, and
Sigmoid kernel

SVM maps a vector into the high dimensional feature
space by a kernel function, where the boundary of
classification is clear. SVM makes use of only the
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support vectors to form the decision surface, where
the vectors are the points with equal constraints
in the Lagrange Multiplier satisfying Karush-KuhnTucker (KKT) conditions. The decision surface can be
non-linear in raw space. We use Linear, Polynomial,
RBF, and Sigmoid kernel functions, and show the
difference. We also test SVM on both normalized and
raw datasets.
5.9

Classifiers 11–13: k nearest neighbors based
on Euclidean, Manhattan, and Mahalanobis
distance

This algorithm takes the typing rhythm as the point
in space. The k nearest neighbors algorithm is to
find the k nearest points of a certain vector by
Euclidean, Manhattan, Mahalanobis, or any other
distance measurement. Furthermore, the resulting label
is the class that appears most in the k nearest neighbors.
The important parameter is the number of neighbors; if
k is too large, the model would be too simple and underfitting. It is therefore necessary to test the classifier
performance with different neighbor numbers.
From the process in the k-NN algorithm, the results
of the classifier must belong to one of the labels in
the training dataset. Therefore, the classifier cannot
be applied to the open set test, regardless of the
threshold to form new clusters, which leads to the
unfairness in misclassifying new individuals. Similar
to the Euclidean classifier, we leave out the open set
test of k-NN. However in our evaluation, we test the
normalized k-NN.
5.10

Classifier 14:
(ANN)

Artificial Neural Networks

We build a neural network model with p input nodes
and 3 levels with 32 neurons in each level due to the
fact that the dataset for training is small and the subject
number is 51, where p is the number of features. Each
level uses sigmoid as the activation function, and the
output is the probability of the subject. For each subject,
we use the data as the positive label and the others
as negative to train the model. When testing, the test
vector runs through all the models of subjects and the
subject label with maximal probability is picked up.
ANN also provides the decision surface to be the model
of each subject and the open set can be tested on it. A
normalized ANN was also implemented.
5.11

Classifier 15: Random forest

A random forest contains many classification trees. For
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a certain subject, not all of the trees draw good results.
However, by considering the results of all trees, the
label given by well-performed trees will be weighted
more, while the bad ones less, and the forest is an
integrated result.
Random forest is an ensemble classifier and the
number of trees is the main parameter. If there are not
enough trees in the random forest, well-trained trees
would not exist and the model would predict wrong.
If there are too many trees, the classifier would be
complex in training and over-fitting. We tested the 51
datasets on different number of trees. Additionally, we
also tested the normalized dataset as well as the raw
dataset on random forest.

6

Performance Comparison

In this section, we introduce the performance metrics to
measure different classifiers. We then show the results
of the 10-folder validation of each classifier following
the results of the open set test.
6.1

Calculating classifier performance

For a one-against-rest algorithm, we measure the
performance by False-Negative Identification Rate
(FNIR)[24] and False-Positive Identification Rate
(FPIR). In our evaluation, taking si as the positive
subject, a false-negative occurs when the sample in
class si is misclassified as class sj , where si ¤ sj is
the classifier of subject si . Similarly, a false-positive
occurs when the sample in sj is misclassified as si ,
where sj ¤ si is the classifier of subject sj .
For FNIR and FPIR, we used F1-measure to measure
the performance of the classification. The F1-measure
is the harmonic mean of the two rates, which is closer to
the lowest one. Therefore, the F1-measure reflects the
worse-case scenario of the classifiers.
In summary, we used 10-folder cross validation
and F1-measure for testing of the classifiers, which
maintained the dataset and metrics in the same level and
the classifiers were easily compared.
6.2

Training and testing the classifiers

Consider that a system has been trained to verify
whether the subject getting access is legitimate. We are
typically more interested in identifying the insider if an
anomalous access has been detected. We employ the
one-versus-rest model where the rest stands for part of
the other subjects, which is feasible in practice. Given
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the typing rhythm dataset of some subjects, we trained
the model of each subject with the dataset of its own as
a positive label, part of the other subjects as a negative
label, and the rest for the new insiders for testing. Then
we test the performance in two cases: inner and open
sets.
6.2.1

Inner classification performance

The trained dataset of the classifier of one subject is
formed by the typing data of the subject and all other
subjects’ typing data. Additionally, there are 51 total
subjects in the dataset taken as S D fs1 ; s2 ; :::; s51 g.
For subject sk , we take the subjects S=fsk g D
fs1 ; s2 ; :::; sk 1 ; skC1 ; :::; s51 g as the negative label. We
train the classifier of each subject sk in S by 10-folder
validation to check the performance. In the 10-folder
validation, a settled group is used to reduce the
randomness of the dataset in order to keep the classifiers
tested in the same situation. We use F1-measure to
quantify the performance, which is the harmonic mean
of the precision and recall ratio. The F1-measure with
different classifiers mentioned above is shown in Fig. 5.
As the F1-measures of some classifiers are near zero,
we only display those with high values in the figure.
All results are shown in Table 2.
Figure 5 is plotted in a violin-plot, which shows the
mean and full distribution of data. For each violin,
the left side colored white is the distribution of the F1measure of classifiers on the raw dataset, and the right
Table 2

F1-measure of all classifiers in inner testing.

Classifier
L1 Norm
Euclidean
Distance
Manhattan
Mahalanobis
Fisher LDA
GPC
Linear
Polynomial
SVM
RBF
Sigmoid
Euclidean
k-NN
Manhattan
Mahalanobis
ANN
Random forest
Random guessing

F1-measure (%)
Raw
Norm
dataset
dataset
1:8 824
1:9 755
3:7 255
5:6 949
4:8 922
7:1 062
3:9 423
3:9 274
32:4 379 38:1 318
70:4 185 39:1 513
5:9 230
6:0 461
5:8 093
5:9 127
3:5 625
0
1:9 608
1:9 608
52:6 507 57:3 094
52:5 654 57:3 178
0:0 754
0:0 754
5:8 769
0
67:3 017 69:0 190
1:9 608
1:9 608

Improvement
(%)
4:95
52:86
45:26
0:38
17:55
44:34
2:08
1:78
–
0:0
8:85
9:04
0:0
–
2:55
–
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Fig. 5 F1-measure of high-performance classifiers in inner
testing (kNN-Man stands for k nearest neighbors with
Manhattan distance and KNN-Eu stands for k nearest
neighbors with Euclidean distance).

is the normalized dataset.
For classifiers in Fig. 5, F1-measures of each
classifier are greater than zero, most of which had
better performance after normalization. However, the
F1-measure of normalized GPC is not better than the
GPC on raw dataset. As introduced in Section 6,
GPC models the subjects by the posterior probabilities.
When normalized, the randomness of the subjects’
typing data is also reduced and GPC cannot study
the probability well. Therefore, normalization is not
appropriate for GPC because it destroys the original
probability distribution.
For other classifiers appearing in Fig. 5,
normalization helps to improve the F1-measure
for the following reasons: (1) after normalization, the
typing data are all in the same length, and the typing
features are more disciplinary as is shown in Fig. 2;
(2) the normalized features with better dispersion make
intraclass dispersion lower and interclass dispersion
higher, which suits some classifiers, such as Fisher
LDA and k-NN, taking the typing data as a point in
space; (3) random forest uses the features directly
to train classification trees, and therefore it is better
to use more regular features to classify. For these
classifiers, GPC with the raw dataset has the best
performance followed by random forest with both raw
and normalized datasets.
There are also many classifiers not appearing in
Fig. 5, such as distance-based ones and SVM, and
their performance is shown in Table 2. For distancebased classifiers, including Euclidean, Manhattan, and
Mahalanobis, we trained them as one-against-rest
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models in order to maintain the same situation as other
classifiers. However, these models are not applicable to
one-against-rest models. Taking the Euclidean distancebased classifier as an example, when training the model
of one subject, the dataset of the other subjects are
considered the negative label and the mean vector
stands for them. However, the mean vector is a mixture
of many other subjects’ typing data, which may not
have an obvious clustering center. Thus, the model
could not classify every subject well. The F1-measure
approximates to 2%, which equals random guessing.
Therefore, the F1-measures of these classifiers are not
marked in Fig. 5.
6.2.2

Open set testing performance

For a certain subject, we take his/her own data and
part of the other subjects’ data as the training dataset.
The typing data of subjects not in training are used to
test, which is called an open set test. Additionally, for
subject sk , we randomly select n subjects to form the
training dataset T D fs1 ; s2 ; :::; sn ; sk g. When testing,
we use the data of subjects O D S=fs1 ; s2 ; :::; sn ; sk g to
check the performance of extensibility. The 10-folder
validation is designed as follows: (1) the training set
T is divided into 10 groups and we use nine of them
to train; (2) the rest along with the open set O form
the testing set. Therefore, for an open set test, FNIR
and FPIR are calculated and we use F1-measure for
performance comparison.
Classifiers, such as k nearest neighbors and distancebased methods including Euclidean, could not identify
the new label that does not appear in the training data.
Therefore, we only test the following classifiers on the
open set test: Fisher LDA, GPC, SVM, neural networks,
and random forest. The mean and variance of the F1measure of them are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7.
For SVM and neural networks, the F1-measures of
the open set test approximate to random guessing. The
poor performance in the open set test concludes that the
model of every subject needs to be rebuilt when a new
individual arrives, or the classifiers would misclassify
the new individual as an existing subject.
In the open set test, the F1-measures for each
classifier using raw or normalized datasets looked the
same, which means the performance did not improve by
normalization. The F1-measure only increased slightly
after normalization.
As shown in Fig. 6, the F1-measure of Fisher LDA
increased to the maximum and then declined slowly
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individual should be retrained. Random forest performs
better on the open set test with high F1-measure. When
the training set grows, F1-measure grows until it is
stable. In terms of training, random forest is simpler
than Fisher LDA, and performs well on the open set
test because the users do not have to consider the size
of the training dataset. The open set test shows the
expansibility of the classifiers and it is closer to the
practical application scenario. Therefore, the random
forest algorithm performed the best of these classifiers.
6.2.3

Fig. 6

Fig. 7

F1-measure of Fisher LDA in open set test.

F1-measure of random forest in open set test.

until it was stable, when the training data grew. At
the beginning, the training data set is insufficient, and
the decision surface is determined by partial data and is
inaccurate. When the training data reached to a certain
range, 8–15 individuals, the decision surface is well
trained and the F1-measure is at its maximum. When
there are too many negative individuals in the training
dataset, the surface would tilt towards the positive side
in order to correctly classify the negative set with a
large number of data. Therefore, the equalization of
the training data set should be considered when using
Fisher LDA in practical applications.
However, for GPC, the performance is not as good
as that of the inner test, with the F1-measure less than
40%. Random forest had pretty good performance in
this case, with an F1-measure up to 92% when the
training set grew. Although GPC performs well in the
inner test, it is only applicable to the scenario in which
all the individuals are present in the training set. If
a new individual arrives, the model of every existing

Parameters
algorithms

in

the

well-performing

There are key parameters influencing the performance
of the k-NN and random forest classifiers. Thus, we
tested some parameters on these algorithms.
Figure 8 exhibits that the F1-measure varies with the
number of neighbors in k-NN where it can be observed
that the F1-measure decreases when the number of
neighbors increases with jitter. It depicts that the nearest
neighbors algorithm is more suitable for keystroke
dynamics. Based on the results, we can conclude that
the typing data, which are considered to be vectors
in the Euclidean space, are not clustered but aliased,
which causes a drop in the F1-measure as the number
of neighbors increases. In case of random forest,
which exhibits the best performance, two parameters,
including experimental threshold and tree number,
where threshold exhibits the ratio of probability
according to the algorithm, because we model the
classification as one-again-rest labeled as binary. In case
of a binary classifier, “1” denotes acceptance, whereas
“0” denotes rejection. We compare the threshold with
the ratio of the probabilities of “1” and “0” that

Fig. 8 F1-measure varies with neighbor numbers in k
nearest neighbors.
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is given using random forest. The results when
the ratio is 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.5, and 1.0 are depicted in Fig. 9.
Figure 9 depicts the F1-measure of the random forest
algorithm with 51 trees in different threshold ratios.
Further, the maximum value is observed when the ratio
is 0.3. Because the positive labeled data are observed
to be more than negative in the training set, we can
consider the priori information that are represented by
the positive labeled proportion.
Additionally, while setting the threshold as 0.3, we
test the random forest with different numbers of trees.
Figure 10 depicts that the F1-measure increases when
the number of trees increases; further, it remains
constant when the number of trees is approximately
more than 50, which is similar to the number of subjects
in the dataset.
Therefore, in case of random forest, to achieve a
better performance in an actual application scenario,
the threshold should be set to ensure that the positive

Fig. 9 The varying F1-measure varies with threshold in
random forest.

and negative datasets are maintained balance; further,
the number of trees should be more than the number of
individuals; however, the number of trees also affects
the training speed and complexity, with low speed and
high complexity being observed when the number of
trees is more.
6.2.4

Performance of one-class classifiers

For some of the classifiers that are mentioned in
Section 5, there are also corresponding one-class
classifiers. For distance-based algorithms, including
Euclidean, Manhattan, Mahalanobis, and one-class
SVM, a threshold can be set to the decision surface
and the data can be separated without any contribution
from the negative data in training set. In this method,
the threshold is selected according to a given FRR by
considering 5% for an example, and the FAR that is
obtained is presented in Table 3.
In case of Euclidean distance one-class classification,
the performance considerably decreases after
normalization because normalizing the typing data
by the time length causes lose of the tapping-duration
information for one certain subject, whereas the
classifier verifying based on the frequency of only a
single subject does not exhibit a similar performance
to that observed before normalization. In case of
Manhattan-based distance one-class classification, the
distribution of the data points in the Manhattan space as
well as the performance of the classifier are improved
by considering the mean absolute deviation of each
dimension. Similarly, in case of Mahalanobis-based
distance one-class classification, the distribution of
each dimension of data is considered to estimate the
Mahalanobis distance; therefore, the performance
of this type of classification remains stable after
normalization, which has already been achieved while
calculating the distances. In case of one-class SVM,
RBF kernel normalizes the data in each dimension and
the performance is similar in both raw and normalized
dataset.
Table 3

F1-measure of one-class classifiers.

Classifier
Euclidean
Manhattan
Mahalanobis
One-class SVM

Distance
Fig. 10 The varying F1-measure varies with tree number in
random forest.
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FAR (%)
Raw
Norm
dataset
dataset
9:4458 19:6787
15:4739 15:3815
19:6787 19:5842
10:9158 11:9292

Improvement (%)
108:3328
0:5971
0:4802
8.4951
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Discussion

Based on the aforementioned studies, we only
normalized the dataset before training. However, there
are more methods using high dimensional data such
as Principal Component Analysis (PCA)[25] , which can
be used to analyze the network dataset. As depicted
in Fig. 3, the data appear to be regularly in part of
the typing moment. There is also some confusion in
terms of the typing moment; therefore, a better feature
extraction method should be developed. Further, we
only use the typing dataset, including H and UD,
while there is a need to select some better features of
typing to gain F1-measure according to the physical
nature of keystroking. Furthermore, the parameters of
neural network, including the number of level and
neurons in experiment, which are not well designed
for the algorithm, exhibit low convergence and the
performance seems to be not better than that of random
forest. Thus, further evaluations on data processing
and parameter selection are required in future studies.
Meanwhile, the Generative Adversarial Networks[26, 27]
can generate a typing rhythm of an individual based on
the dataset we collected and the discriminator can be
used in keystroke dynamics.

8

Conclusion

Currently, there exist several classification algorithms
that are proposed for identifying or authenticating
individuals using the keystroking rhythm while they
are all tested using different datasets and measured
by different metrics, which makes it hard to compare
the classification algorithms in a similar situation.
Therefore, we tested 15 classifiers in the same
dataset and the same environment. We also came
up with a method to preprocess the keystroking
dataset — normalization. We used the F1-measure to
measure the performance of each algorithm in both
raw and normalized datasets. Combining the practical
application scenarios, we tested the classifiers on
an open set. Random forest performed well both in
the inner and open set tests, which can be used
without rebuilding the model of existing individuals
when new individuals arrive. Alternatively, GPC with
normalization can also solve the user identification
problem, but it can meet the actual demand and it should
be retrained with new individuals. Finally, we discussed
the number of neighbors in k nearest neighbors as well
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as the threshold and tree number in random forest, and
gave advice on how to use these classifiers.
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